Nssm-2.24 Exploit

The NSSM-2.24 Exploit: Understanding and Mitigating the Vulnerability

Claim 1: Privilege Escalation via Weak Service Permissions

Reality: NSSM 2.24, when used to install a service, creates a service with default permissions. By default, the SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS is not granted to low-privileged users. However, if an administrator installs a service using NSSM without locking down the service’s DACL (Discretionary Access Control List), a local attacker with authenticated access could modify the service binary path. nssm-2.24 exploit

If C:\My.exe exists, Windows will execute it before C:\My Tools\app.exe. This is a classic unquoted service path vulnerability. The NSSM-2

The NSSM (Non-Sucking Service Manager) version 2.24 is not associated with a single, unique "CVE exploit" in the traditional sense. Instead, because it is a service helper program that runs with high privileges, it is frequently a target for Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) through misconfigurations in the software that bundles it. Key Exploitation Scenarios Escalate Privileges : An attacker can gain elevated

Exploit Mechanism: If the directory containing nssm.exe has weak permissions (e.g., Builtin\Users has "Full Control" or "Modify" rights), a low-privileged user can replace the legitimate nssm.exe with a malicious binary. Upon the next service restart or system reboot, the malicious code executes with SYSTEM privileges.

Quote Paths: Always ensure service paths are quoted in the registry to prevent unquoted path attacks.